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Ata glance 
• A complex heating scandal has recently resulted in 
the collapse of Northern Ireland's devolved 
government. 
The heating scheme at issue is the Renewable Heat 
Incentive, which is intended to stimulate the 
increased derivation of heat from renewable 
sources. 
• Northern Ireland retains a greater degree of 
devolved energy competence than the UK's other 
subnational jurisdictions. An equivalent 
Renewable Heat Incentive scheme has been rolled 
out across Great Britain, but officials in the 
Northern Ireland Executive have used their powers 
to adjust the scheme's financial mechanisms in a 
detrimental way. 
The cost to the Northern Irish taxpayer of the 
consequent design faults is estimated at £490m. 
• These flaws came to light in conjunction with 
allegations of extreme mismanagement, faulty 
governance and fraud. A variety of allegations and 
revelations ran to the heart of the devolved 
administration, and the Northern Irish government 
presently collapsed under these pressures. 
This article considers the development and 
application of the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) 
scheme in Northern Ireland, and addresses the major 
scandal that arose as a consequence of the scheme's 
design and implementation, ultimately resulting In the 
collapse of the Northern Irish government and 
significantly threatening the future of devolution in 
the jurisdiction. 
Devolution and energy in Northern 
Ireland 
Northern Ireland's current devolved arrangements 
were established in the late 1990s after a long period 
of Direct Rule from Westminster (largely since 1972, 
subject to some generally unsuccessful efforts to 
restore devolution). The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA 
1998) established the primary governance 
architecture, and included the creation of a Northern 
Ireland Assembly that can legislate on devolved 
matters, and a Northern Ireland Executive. It is well 
known that life in Northern Ireland has been subject 
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over modern times to violent conflict - an era often 
euphemistically described as 'The Troubles' - and that 
the jurisdiction is presently undergoing a post-Troubles 
transition. As such, it is unsurprising to find that 
Northern Ireland's devolved institutions have rested on 
shaky social-political foundations since their recent 
inception. The institutions have been suspended 
temporarily in 2000,1 and again over 2002-2007.2 
As a measure to incentivise the sourcing of heat 
energy from renewable means, the RHI scheme is an 
energy~specific matter. The present author, working 
with Professor Geraint Ellis of Queen's University 
Belfast, has recently'mapped'the allocation of low 
carbon energy-specific powers across the UK's 
national and devolved jurisdictions.3 In the case of 
Northern Ireland, the research outputs show that 
energy competence is largely devolved to Northern 
Ireland under the terms of the devolving legislatlon,4 
but that this understanding must be qualified by 
energy's cross-cutting nature, which engages with 
governance in a range of broader competence areas 
including planning, housing (domestic heat and 
electricity consumption), etc. Certain nuanced 
governance features unique to Northern Ireland also 
impact the practical use of allocated powers, including 
a Single Electrlclty Market that operates across the 
island of Ireland, which is operated by Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of lreland.5 
In other words, while the major devolving legislation 
ostensibly asserts that energy is a 'devolved' 
competence, it is the case that the assumption that 
'energy is "Fully Devolved~ .. substantially overlooks 
the contingent nature of the Devolved 
Administration's responsibilities and the complex way 
in which the scope to act, or not act, is underpinned 
by a broad range of conditions and qualifications:6 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Northern Ireland has a 
breadth of devolved energy competence that exceeds 
the powers that have been legislatively devolved to 
Scotland and Wales.7The manner in which 
constitutional law frames legislatively and executively 
devolved energy controls forms an essential backdrop 
to the RHI scandal: it has been alleged that the 
Northern Irish department holding primary 
responsibility for energy governance has misused its 
capacity for action in this area to absorb, adjust and 
implement a flawed incentive scheme that has 
otherwise worked across the rest of the UK without 
major issue. 
The RHI scheme 
The Northern Ireland Executive established the RHI 
scheme in November 2012. The department with 
energy responsibility at this time was the Department 
of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI; the 
department no longer exists due to governance 
restructuring). The Minister at the head of that 
department, Arlene Foster of the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP), oversaw the scheme's development and 
signed off on it. Foster went on to become First 
Minister of Northern Ireland, and was in that position 
when the devolved government recently collapsed. 
As noted, the scheme's purpose is to stimulate 
increased deployment of renewably-sourced heat. 
Although Northern Ireland is some way off the 
national pace in the sphere of climate governance,8 
the RHI is part of a progressive effort to work towards 
a target of 10% heat to be derived from renewable 
sources by 2020.9 Its design is intended to provide a 
financial incentive to install renewable heat systems, 
and it has been targeted at non-domestic users, 
including businesses (although a domestic version has 
been phased in subsequently). While these systems 
include solar thermal and heat pumps, the systems at 
the centre of the scandal involve biomass boilers that 
mostly work by burning wood pellets. The RHI 
incentivises the use of these boilers by providing users 
with a large subsidy payment at a flat rate that 
extends over 20 years. 
Much could be said about the scheme's design flaws, 
but to summarise the essential issues in concise terms 
for the purposes of this article, the crucial issue is that 
DETI in effect took the 'national' version of RHI that 
was to be applied across Great Britain - which has 
worked fine- and applied it Northern Ireland, but 
after having used its constitutional space in the sphere 
of energy to adjust financial aspects of the scheme in 
a detrimental way. Most particularly, these 
adjustments mean that the Northern Irish version~ 
out more in subsidies than the cost of the fuel at issue. 
Consequently, this incentivises RHI beneficiaries to 
burn more and more fuel in order to accrue more and 
more profit. Further, the Northern Irish adjustments 
dictate that approved applications are to continue to 
receive these payouts for the duration of a locked-in 
20 year period (unlike the Great Britain version, which 
employs sophisticated tariff controls). As noted, the 
estimated and unforeseen cost to the Northern Irish 
taxpayer of the botched scheme is £490m. At present, 
discussions about how to change the locked-in design 
in order to mitigate these costs are ongoing; however, 
any substantial changes made by the Assembly or 
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Executive will likely raise complex legal problems that 
potentially include issues concerning the enactment 
of retrospective legislation, breach of contract, etc. 
Problematic aspects of the RHI design can be usefully 
viewed across a series of periods. The first period 
concerns the years running from the scheme's 
inception up to April 2015. Over 2011-201 s, £2Sm was 
budgeted to cover the scheme, but over 2014- 2015 a 
lack of uptake saw a departmental underspend of 
£ 1 Sm. The next period concerns April 2015 to February 
2016. Here, from April, RHI applications began to 
increase dramatically. The BBC has noted that'[s)ome 
984 applications were received in just three months -
September, October and November 2015 - after 
officials announced plans to cut the subsidy but before 
the change took effect:10 Thus, '[o]ut of a total of almost 
2,000 RHI applications, just under half were made in 
the space of seven weeks, and it was that flurry of 
applications which pushed the RHI budget beyond its 
limits, leaving taxpayers with an unexpected bill:11 The 
next period concerns February 2016 onward.In 
February 2016, DETI Minister Jonathan Bell of the DUP, 
who by this time had stepped into Foster's role, 
announced that he intended to close the scheme to 
new applications. Bell was presently ejected from the 
party after giving an in-depth interview to the media 
on RHI matters (see below). 
As noted, the responsible DETI Minister over the 
period ofthe RHl's Inception, design and early 
extended implementation was Arlene Foster (DUP 
leader since December 2015). Departmental changes 
mean that DETI no longer exists, with primary 
authority over energy governance now resting with 
the Department for the Economy. This department Is 
headed by Economy Minister Simon Hamilton, a DUP 
member and close political ally of Foster's. Foster went 
on to become First Minister of Northern Ireland, and 
was In that position as the RHI scandal developed and 
became public knowledge. Her persistent efforts to 
deflect responsibility for the scheme and to resist calls 
from unionist and nationalist parties across the 
Northern Irish political spectrum to step aside while a 
substantial independent inquiry into the RHI could be 
undertaken, or to step down altogether, permitted the 
narrower crisis around the scheme to culminate in a 
much broader crisis of governance. This resulted 
ultimately in the resignation of Northern Ireland's 
Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness and the 
collapse of the entire government. 
Fire and brimstone: the collapse of 
the devolved administration 
An investigation into the RHI scheme commenced in 
February 2016. It was galvanised by both the irregular 
spike in applications noted above (over September-
November 2015), and by the testimony of a 
whistleblower, who contacted the Northern Ireland 
Executive in January 2016 stating that 'an empty farm 
shed was being heated for the subsidy and factories 
wh ich did not need the heat were running large 
boilers 24 hours a day to earn money:1i The 
investigation uncovered evidence of significant 
fraudulent behaviour. It also emerged that another 
whistleblower - a woman who runs a heat ing 
company- had been pressing DETI for action to be 
taken in relation to the scheme for some time. She 
contacted Foster initially in August 2013, and was in 
touch again with her department in 2014 and 2015, 
but, she said, '[i]t felt like I was hitting a brick wall'. 13 It 
also emerged that the Ulster Farmers Union, 
possessed of specialised knowledge of farmers' 
investment practices, had met with Stormont officials 
in July 2015 and 'warned of an imminent spike in 
demand'; officials did not apply this knowledge in 
order to avert the uptake either.14 
On the BBC's Stephen Nolan Show, the DUP's Jonathan 
Bell gave an in-depth, emotional interview, claiming 
that he had endeavoured to wind down the scheme 
prior to the crucial flood of applications, but had been 
obstructed in doing so by DUP special advisors and 
Foster. Foster was interviewed separately on the 
programme, denying any wrongdoing. 15 The BBC 
summarises that, amongst other things, 'Mr Bell 
claimed that two senior DUP advisers "were not 
allowing the scheme to be closed" at the point when 
costs were spiralling out of control in autumn 2015:16 
The advisers he identified were Timothy Johnston and 
Dr Andrew Crawford. Crawford was at that time an 
aide within DETI. It presently came to light that 
Crawford's brother was director of a company that was 
receiving the RHI subsidies. When pressed before 
Northern Ireland's Public Accounts Committee to 
name an advisor of Foster's who he believed to be 
exerting influence over the RHI scheme, senior civil 
servant Dr Andrew McCormick named Crawford.17 Bell 
also claimed that a DUP special adviser to Foster, 
Stephen Brimstone, had been present at a 
confrontational meeting with Foster where Bell was 
trying to secure the closure of the scheme. Brimstone 
quit his job as adviser to Foster (November 2016), and 
it emerged in the month following this that he was an 
RHI claimant (December 2016). Investigative reporting 
from the Irish News further revealed that a business 
run by his brother, the husband of former DUP 
councillor Alison Brimstone, was also claiming the 
subsidies.18 
Space precludes elaboration of the significant amount 
of additional alleged conflicts of interest and 
associated revelations that have recently emerged. 
These developments united all major unionist, 
nationalist and other parties across the Northern Irish 
political spectrum (apart from Foster's own DUP) in 
calling for Foster to step aside either temporarily or 
permanently so that a fully independent public 
inquiry could be conducted. Foster has persistently 
refused to do so. Under the Northern Irish 
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const itutional arrangements Foster of the DUP and 
Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein had been hold ing 
joint office as first minister and deputy first minister 
respectively.1 9 With Foster refusing to move, 
McGuinness ultimately resigned, collapsing the 
government and triggering fresh elections.20 It is now 
agreed that a public inquiry into the RHI will be 
undertaken, chaired by retired appeal court Judge Sir 
Patrick Coghlin. 
Voters in Northern Ireland still largely vote along 
ethno-religious lines, with the two major parties, the 
DUP and Sinn Fein, absorbing the significant majority 
of the votes falling within the extremes of loyalism-
unionism and republicanism-nationalism respectively. 
As such, large numbers of votes for these parties are 
virtually assured, given present voting biases. 
Nonetheless, in the recent elections triggered by the 
government's collapse (2 March 2017) the DUP's vote 
has contracted (and nationalist votes have expanded), 
with the DUP remaining the largest party by only one 
Assembly seat over Sinn Fein. At the time of writing, 
politicians are endeavouring to restore and sustain a 
renewed devolved government, with Foster and the 
DUP insisting that Foster must remain in power. The 
BBC's political editor Mark Devenport has commented 
that'[w]e have all been burned, some heads must 
surely roll, but Stormont needs to act swiftly to put out 
this impossibly expensive fire:21 The problem is, given 
Northern Ireland's complex constitutional 
arrangements, no heads have rolled. 
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